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I.
Maples v. Thomas-The Tale of the Holographic Counsel
a. Case History
In an Alabama Court in 1997, Cory Maples sat as the Defendant in his trial for capital murder of two of his "friends," 1 after police had apprehended him in Tennessee two weeks after the shootings had occurred. 2 He wrote a confession that he had "shot and killed two boys while they sat in a car in the driveway of [his] home." 3 He had been drinking earlier in the day but said he "didn't 'know why'" he shot the two. 4 Maples was appointed counsel based on his indigency, counsel that had "relatively scant experience in capital cases" and were eligible under Alabama's capital defense statutes at the time to receive a total of $1,000 in fees for their work, preparation, and time spent in trial and sentencing. 5 Trial counsel failed to introduce evidence of Maples's history of drug use; 6 failed to introduce witness evidence that Maples was "doing crystal meth and crack" on the night of the shootings (although they did equivocate during sentencing, where they brought out Maples's alcohol and drug use on that night); 7 and failed to request an instruction on voluntary intoxication or manslaughter. 8 Unsurprisingly, the jury in Maples's case found him guilty of both capital crimes and recommended death by a vote of 10 to 2-the slimmest margin by which a jury may recommend death and a judge may 1 Brief for Respondent at 3, Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912 (2012) (No. 10-63). Maples later described the two victims as "'two boys,'" but one can glean no further information from the briefs. Id. 2 Id. 3 Id. 4 Id. 5 Brief for Petitioner at 6, Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912 (2012) (No. 10-63). 6 Id. at 7. 7 Id. at 7-8 (citing Record of the Circuit Court of Morgan County, Alabama, Case No. CC95-842, at 1894). 8 Id. at 7. Maples's counsel also shifted possible motives in their opening and closing arguments, at one point "conced [ing] " that "there was a loss of life caused intentionally at the hands of Corey [sic] Maples," and referred to their own efforts during sentencing as "stumbling around in the dark." Id. (citing Record, supra note 7, at 2914, 3081-82).
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The State moved to dismiss Maples's Rule 32 petition, and although the trial court denied the State's motion, it dismissed Maples's petition entirely eighteen inactive months later, on May 22, 2003. 18 The order was appealable for only forty-two days; 19 Maples never received notice of this order, Ingen-Housz and Munaka never filed any appeal, and the time lapsed. 20 Later discoveries revealed that the two associates had left Sullivan & Cromwell during the summer of 2002 but had notified no one in Alabama, including Maples. 21 The copies of the Rule 32 Order that the Alabama court clerk had mailed to Ingen-Housz and Munaka were returned clerk with "Returned to Sender-Attempted Unknown" and "Returned to Sender-Attempted
Not Known" stamped on the envelopes, and "Return to Sender-Left Firm" written on the front. 22 Butler received the Order and, consistent with his "no other role" maxim, did nothing with it. 23 The Alabama court clerk, similarly, did nothing. 24 Despite the notice of the denied
Order reaching the offices of at least three different parties, apathy reigned, and Maples sat in prison, none the wiser.
It was not until the State itself, against ethical rules, directly mailed Maples that he found out about his dismissed Rule 32 petition and quickly lapsing timeline in which to file a federal habeas corpus petition. 25 Maples called his stepmother, she called Sullivan & Cromwell, 18 Id. 19 See ALA. R. APP. P. 4(a). 20 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 5, at 10. 21 Id. at 11. The two associates remained on Maples's case as attorneys of record; no one else from Sullivan & Cromwell was on the case. Id. at 12. 22 Id. 23 Id. 24 Id. Ingen-Housz and Munaka had even left personal telephone numbers and home addresses, and the clerk had access to Maples's prison address. Id. at 11-12. 25 Id. at 12. In Alabama, attorneys must not communicate with an opposing party known to be represented by counsel. Cromwell associates, none of whom were admitted to practice pro hac vice or otherwise in Alabama, 27 De Leeuw filed an out-of-time appeal of the dismissal of the Rule 32 Order. 28 The Alabama trial court, Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals, and Alabama Supreme Court all denied the Order. 29 The U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari, 30 propelling the case into federal habeas corpus proceedings.
In federal habeas corpus, the new Sullivan & Cromwell team raised the now-defaulted,
and not appealed, ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims from State post-conviction, as well as Maples's preserved claims from direct review. 31 The State argued, and the district court agreed and held, that Maples had defaulted on his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and that federal review of those claims was barred. 32 The district court, however, did "authorize[] an appeal," noting that it was to be decided whether Maples could establish "cause" to excuse this default "given the extraordinary circumstances underlying the default." 33 The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the default was based on an independent and adequate Alabama procedural rule and that Maples (2003) ). As the Court notes, however, that Assistant Attorney General Hayden sent this communication directly to Maples was an indication that Hayden himself believed Maples was no longer represented. Id. 26 Brief for Respondent, supra note 1, at 9. 27 Id. at 10. 28 Id. at 11. 29 Id. The trial court disagreed that the court clerk had made any error, hypothetically asking "How can a Circuit Clerk in Decatur, Alabama [,] know what is going on in a law firm in New York, New York?" Brief for Petitioner, supra note 5, at 12-13. 30 Brief for Respondent, supra note 1, at 11. 31 Id. at 12. 32 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 5, at 13-14. 33 Id. at 14.
had failed to show the requisite "cause" to excuse his default. 34 Judge Barkett in the Eleventh Circuit dissented from this ruling, concluding that the default rule was not adequate, and that, even if it was:
[T]he interests of justice . . . require that Maples be permitted review of his claims when the alleged default of those claims occurred through no fault of his own.
Rather, any such default is entirely the fault of his post-conviction counsel, and this court is allowing him to be put to death because of that negligence. 35 Maples petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for certiorari once again, and this time, on
March 21, 2011, the Court granted the petition. 36
b. Supreme Court Decision
In a seven-to-two decision authored by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the U. 38 Id. 39 Id. at 918 (quoting Alabama Rule Governing Admission to the Bar VII (2000) (dictating that "local counsel 'accept joint and several responsibility with the foreign attorney to the client . . . in all matters'") (emphasis added)). According to one amici cited by the Court, local counsel rarely associate in any significant way in the case and "most often do nothing other than provide the mechanism for foreign Cromwell, they failed to seek leave from the trial court to withdraw, adding an additional ethical dimension to their actions. 40 The Court began its analysis by quoting the rule of procedural default: where a state court has declined to hear a habeas petitioner's claims on the basis of a state procedural default in the preceding proceedings and this default rests on "'independent and adequate state procedural grounds,'" a federal court may not then review those claims. 41 In most cases, this means the federal reviewing court will examine the law that supported the lower state court's decision: if the state-court judgment relied entirely on state law, it is considered "independent" of federal law. 42 So long as this State rule serves "a legitimate state interest," the reviewing court will consider it to also be adequate, and the decision will, thus, be unreviewable. 43 prisoner's postconviction attorney does not qualify as 'cause.'" 46 This is so, spoke the Court, because the attorney acts as the prisoner's agent, and "under 'well-settled principles of agency law,'" the prisoner (the principal) "bears the risk of negligent conduct" by his attorney (his agent). 47 Under this "general rule," the missing of a filing deadline by the attorney is attributed to the prisoner and cannot constitute cause to excuse the procedural default. 48 But these "general rules" of agency, spoke the Court, do not apply in situations such as the one presented by Maples's case, where the prisoner's attorney has effectively abandoned his client. 49 Rather, where the attorney has caused the abandonment, and the subsequent default, he or she no longer serves as the agent of the principal (the prisoner). 50 Citing its 2010 decision in the central concern of the writ of habeas corpus'" demanded a different outcome. 66 These "extraordinary circumstances" went "beyond [Maples's] control," and "no just system would lay the default at Maples' death-cell door." 67 The Court held that Maples had established the requisite "cause" to excuse his procedural default and remanded the case for a determination of whether Maples was prejudiced by this default. 68 Justice Samuel Alito concurred in the opinion of the Court but wrote separately to, in a turn, "save face" for the Alabama criminal-justice system. 69 In Justice Alito's view, the Alabama Justice Scalia concluded his dissent with a parting shot at the majority for its bemoaning of the Alabama criminal-justice system, stating that the law "cannot be" that "whenever a defendant's procedural default is caused by his attorney," "fairness justifies excusing [his] procedural default." 87
II. Thoughts and Analysis
The Court raises a number of interesting issues in its opinion. 88 First, did the Court really create a new standard, a "template" for future relief as Justice Scalia termed it? Or was this simply an extraordinary case where the Court decided that the facts reached the threshold needed for it to intervene? The Court's references to the seemingly narrow holding suggest the latter, but perhaps not. And if, in fact, Maples is leading the way for future claims of "severed agencies" creating "cause" for relief of habeas petitioners, what factors matter? What sorts of 84 Id. 85 Id. (quoting Maples, 132 S. Ct. at 926) (majority op.). 86 Id. at 932-33 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("No precedent should be so easily circumvented by word games."). Justice Scalia's inference that such a large number of cases have, or will have, similarly shameful acts of counsel within them is a quizzical one, at best. See infra, Section II(a). 87 Maples, 132 S. Ct. at 934 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 88 Because the amount of information that one could discuss is broad, this Article will limit discussion to criminal and habeas corpus procedural questions, rather than the ethical issues brought up in Maples.
acts, omissions, advocacy failures, or ethical missteps will factor into the calculus of "cause for agency severance" in the future? Does it matter that neither Maples nor his attorneys ever argued that Maples was actually innocent of the crime? Would a believed-innocent client with less-severe facts be more eligible for relief?
Secondly, the Court uses agency principles to achieve its holding, rather than the currently precedent-based position that there simply is no right to counsel during postconviction hearings, and any attorney error committed therein is simply imputed to the client due to this lack of a right. 89 Justice Scalia in dissent, however, notes the lack of a right, citing
Pennsylvania v. Finley. Given the potential shift in the law in this area via future cases, 90 one is left to wonder if this is simply the way the Court chose to rule to further limit its holding or if is it a sign of things to come.
Lastly, the Court holds that "no just system" would allow Maples to lose in his quest for habeas relief on the basis of the exceptional facts presented. Yet, in the past, the Court has refused to give relief to others in similarly perilous factual circumstances. What are, then, the guidelines for this "just system," and why do some acts of the Court not impinge on this and if it is limited to "extraordinary" case facts, the Court has not given any real suggestions one way or the other of which facts would have to be alleged, shown, pled, or proven.
Some lower courts, however, seem to suggest that some situations are, indeed, egregious enough to grant relief, habeas or otherwise, 108 and others view Maples as creating a threshold test, rather than as a one-time-only escape from procedural default. 109 The "trick" may not be, as
Justice Scalia suggests, to allege that counsel's efforts were so deficient as to belie his or her role as the "agent" of the client. 110 Rather, the "trick" will be to simply have facts that establish that such a role could not have existed. The few "lucky" habeas petitioners who allege truly agencysevering acts of their attorney will be the ones who get relief, which, given some of the examples courts have seen in the past, they sometimes do deserve.
ii. Innocence as Agency-Severing?
Problems of proof and indeterminacy in the holding of Innocence is not a one-use term-a person may be "actually" or "factually" innocent, meaning that he or she is, in fact, not actually the person who committed the crime at all. 113 Distinguishable from this innocence is that of the person who may have committed the act in question but was falsely convicted through some means, persons whose innocence will not be brought to light by means of DNA (as may those in the "actually innocent" category)-the "legally" innocent. 114 The difficulty, as Professor Hughes explains, is that the public, media, and courts rarely consider those in the latter category as innocent at all. 115 to still meet a similar standard. Whatever the case is, the Court was not convinced by the Petition that it was "the very case" in which it could decide the fate of the freestanding claim of actual innocence. Thus, the Court denied certiorari.
"prisoner retains . . . the constitutional rights . . . to treatment as a 'person' for purposes of due process of law" from a sentence of death which "involves . . . a denial of the executed person's humanity"); id.
(commenting that due to the "recognition of human fallibility" involved in the imposition of the death penalty, "the punishment of death must inevitably be inflicted upon innocent men"); id. at 291 (noting lack of hesitancy to hold, solely because "the deliberate extinguishment of human life by the State is uniquely degrading to human dignity, . . . that death is . . . a 'cruel and unusual' punishment"); id. at 359 (Marshall, J., concurring) (concluding that in any situation, " [t] here is no rational basis for concluding that capital punishment is not excessive. It therefore violates the Eighth Amendment."). 129 Id. at 26 (noting that "the First, Fourth, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have assumed . . . a freestanding claim of actual innocence may warrant habeas relief" while the Seventh and Tenth have refused to even accept that such a claim could be established at all). 130 Id. at 9 (describing the "retort" that defense's expert forensic pathologist gave to the State's Medical Examiner-Expert regarding the date of the victim's death based on her autopsy report). 131 Id. at 9-11 (including the State's expert's focus "almost exclusively" on the victim's head, lack of bodyweight loss over the course of the purported time the body had been in the forest, and lack of bloating-a normal occurrence in deceased bodies within a few days-among those points). 132 Id. at 11 n. The future of Maples's holding is to be seen-including whether Justice Scalia's fears of a
Coleman-evading template to relief materialize. With any luck, however, the Court will not again have to face such an embarrassing case of attorney-client-relationship destruction.
Whether or not innocence could play a role in the calculus of agency severance is another interesting consideration that, although not present in Maples's case, could lead the Court to repeat its holding in a future case where the petitioner-defendant has been plagued by "extraordinarily" disconcerting facts and does have such a viable claim of actual innocence.
b. Agency Principles and the Right to Counsel in Post-Conviction Proceedings
In during post-conviction proceedings in these limited situations is still an unanswered question. 144 Instead, the Court held that in these particular situations, where the "initial-review collateral proceeding" is the petitioner's first opportunity to raise a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, the complete lack of counsel or, alternatively, representation by only "substantial[ly]" ineffective counsel, may "establish cause for a prisoner's procedural default" of failing to raise the "claim of ineffective assistance at trial." 145 Thus, the Court did not recognize a constitutional right to have effective counsel during collateral (or "initial review") proceedings where it is the first available opportunity to raise a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. If, however, counsel was constitutionally ineffective in or entirely absent from the "initial review" stage regarding only the ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim, 146 then federal habeas courts would be available to hear that claim. 147 Justice Scalia's dissent showed the rhetorical frustration of an outraged Justice. 148 Among the problems Justice Scalia found with the majority opinion, that most pertinent to the discussion here is his citation, once again, to Pennsylvania v. Finley, which he states "quite clearly foreclosed" the argument that any exception to the "no right to counsel at post-conviction" rule could exist. 149 One may suppose that his cite to Finley in Maples was indeed no fluke, although the majority neither cited Finley nor disturbed that ruling with its narrow holding. 150 Now that the Court has delivered its opinion in Martinez v. Ryan, it seems clear that 181 and a twenty-two percent higher likelihood of a death sentence overall, controlling for fifty mitigating factors, if the victim of the homicide was white. 182 In McCleskey v. Kemp, the Supreme Court considered the information of the Baldus study in the case of a black Georgia man accused of robbing a store and killing a white police officer at the scene. 183 The Court reviewed the study, noting itself the 4.3 times increased chance of a death sentence where the case involved a white victim versus those with a black victim 184 and the finding that black defendants charged with killing white persons were given the death sentence in twenty-two percent of the cases assessed compared to one percent of cases involving black defendants and black victims and three percent of cases involving white defendants and black victims. 185 Despite these alarming statistics, the Court held that the Baldus study, "[a]t most, . . . indicate [d] a discrepancy that appears to correlate with race. Apparent discrepancies in sentencing are an inevitable part of our criminal justice system." 186 To five of the nine Justices, this discrepancy did not "demonstrate a constitutionally significant risk of racial bias." 187 A positive factor of twenty-two based on the randomness of race was insignificant for are judged; that the determination of whether he or she is put to death is not based on arbitrary or capricious factors (such as who he or she killed); 192 and that random factors should not enter into this decision, as they essentially allow the jury to consider the "good" or "worth" of the victim in making its decision. 193 The end result is the potential biasing of the sentencing jury based on whether it thinks the victim was a "better person" and that because this person was the victim, the defendant is less worthy of continued life on this planet.
Second, this change in the Court's jurisprudence was not based on an awakening of reason among its Justices. Rather, it came about due to a change in the arrangement of them. 194 attorneys "at [his] death-cell door" be the same as the system that simply had to wait for the right alignment of Justices 197 to put the law its preferred way?
Admittedly, some of the above-named cases are not as damning of justice or rightness as others. Some have become embedded into our modern culture as accepted methods of police conduct and criminal law. 198 But the overall effect on criminal defendants, and federal habeas corpus petitioners in particular, has been to make the burden of proof of (unreasonable) trial error much more difficult to meet, a showing of "prejudice" or "unjustness" nearly unattainable, obtainment of federal habeas corpus relief effectively implausible, and a "just system" much more of a fiction than a reality.
III. Conclusion
The Court's decision in Maples v. Thomas was the just one. Although the holding may be limited to that one case or, alternatively, may have created an unshaped and undefined rule, it
shows that at a certain point, at a certain level of complete ethical and legal failure and indifference, the Court will step in and right a wrong within this "just system," one in which the client had no part creating and from which he has no respite. Despite his disastrous trial and 197 No pun intended. 198 For example, in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1968), Officer McFadden, an officer of thirty-nine years, saw two men pacing back-and-forth past a few stores, frequently looking into the window, and walking away and at one point speaking briefly with a third man. Officer McFadden's years of experience aroused his suspicions that the two men were "casing a job, a stick-up." Id. at 6. When he followed his suspicions, approached the men, and patted them down in what is now the infamous "Terry-frisk," he discovered weapons on two of the three men. Id. at 7. It is quite likely that Officer McFadden's actions prevented these men from committing a robbery of some sort. 
